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Abstract
Many shareholding structures studies in developed countries have established links between corporate governance and firm performance. However, in developing countries like Nigeria, very little attention has been given to complete disclosure of shareholding structure in relation to firm performance. It is against this background that this study examines the moderating effect of firm size on the relationship between shareholding structure and firm performance. The specific objectives of the study were to determine the direct effect of block-holder ownership on return on assets, and to find the moderating effect firm size on the relationship between block-holder ownership and return on assets. The multiple regression analysis was carried out with aid of robust panel regression using two-models. The findings model I showed that block-holder ownership has an insignificant negative effect on firm performance, while, Model II showed that firm size significantly moderates the relationship between block-holder ownership and firm performance. The study recommends reduced block-holder ownership for improved firm performance among Nigerian quoted commercial banks.
Keywords: Block-shareholding, Financial Performance, Firm Size, Return on Assets, Moderating
Variable.
1 Introduction
Ownership structure is an aspect of corporate governance that is concerned with how the basic units (shares) of an entity are owned and it is extensively seen to be determined by a country’s specific corporate governance characteristics. A firm’s ownership structure is composed of investors, financial institutions, mutual funds, international firms, block-holders, family members and managers. Holderness (2009) points out that ownership structure is one of the most important factors in shaping the corporate governance system of any country. According to him, it determines the nature of the agency problem, which is whether the dominant conflict is between managers and shareholders, or between controlling and minority shareholders, adding that the degree of ownership concentration in a firm determines how power is distributed between its shareholders and managers. When ownership is dispersed, shareholding control tends to be weak because, a small shareholder is unlikely to be interested in monitoring because a large portion on his smaller benefits will go to settle the cost of monitoring (Ohiani, 2018).
The financial performance of many organizations has been largely linked to their ownership structure over time as it provides funding through owner’s equity. The Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance (2018) section 23.1.5 requires that the board of directors must ensure that all shareholders understand the ownership structure of the company, and support them in this by making available, current information on the ultimate beneficial owners of the major shareholdings or any shareholders owning, controlling or influencing five percent (5%) or more of the Company’s shares. Normally, every business organization has the responsibility of making returns for the owners. This is important since the ability of a firm to make returns in the competitive market determines to a large extend its ability to survive in the future. A bank’s ownership structure influences its performance because differences in ownership type: concentration, diversity and resource endowments among shareholders determine their incentives and ability to monitor bank managers.
In Nigeria, the 2000–2010 banking reform led to bank mergers, acquisition and consolidation activities intended to strengthen the banking sector and these activities led to significant changes in bank ownership to permit various ownership systems including wealthy families and rich individuals, institutional, managerial or insider ownership and foreign interests in an attempt to reduce government’s control of banks. This liberal policy consequently resulted in a greater number of individual shareholders with large direct equity holding in Nigerian banks. Moreover, large direct equity ownership by controlling shareholders can have serious consequences for bank profitability depending on whether controlling shareholders have private control benefits or whether there are shared controls benefits that accrue to both controlling and non-controlling owners and this effect also depend on the levels of ownership concentration in Nigerian banks (Ozili et al, 2017). Ownerships should be expanded to include directors, managers, employees, and even customers and suppliers.
Block-holder ownership also called concentrated ownership refers to shareholding with an exceptionally large amount or value of stock. Even though there was no specific definition of how many shares constitute a block, most people using the term refer to holding more than 5% of shares. A major aspect of ownership structure is related to how concentrated the company’s shares are. A company’s ownership is said to be concentrated if a high percentage of shares is in the possession of relatively small number of owners (Citak, 2011) and it is measured a percentage of equity held by block-holders as investors in the firm. The block-holder ownership is said to be concentrated if the majority of the stocks are owned by the minority of individuals or groups, so that the stockholders have more dominant stocks than the others. The important element of stock block ownership by external party is the stronger monitoring over the manager or insider so as to reduce the agency problem between management and stockholders.
The connection between ownership structure and performance has been the subject of an important and ongoing concern in the corporate finance literature as it is the key in determining control of firms. From available literature reviewed, there is no general agreement on the exact effect of ownership structure on business performance. Several Scholars including Ohiani et al, (2018) and Ogega (2014) maintain that ownership structure has a significant effect on firm performance. On the other hand, Aymen (2014) and Falzadal et al, (2011) reported that there is no significant effect of ownership structure on the performance of firms. This lack of consensus among scholars and the paucity of studies conducted that included a moderating variable on the effect of shareholding structure of financial performance necessitate this study.
The main objective of this study is to examine the moderating effect of firm size on shareholding structure and firm performance of the commercial banks listed in Nigeria, while the specific objectives are to:
i. examine effect of block-holder ownership on financial performance of quoted commercial banks Nigerian;
ii. explore the moderating effect of firm size on block-holder ownership and financial performance of quoted commercial banks Nigerian;
In order to achieve the stated objectives of this study, the following null hypotheses were developed:
i. Block-holder ownership has no significant effect on financial performance of quoted commercial banks in Nigeria
ii. There is no moderating effect of firm size on block holder ownership and financial performance of quoted commercial banks in Nigeria
2 Conceptual Review of the Study
The conceptual framework of this study shall be made of the independent variable (Ownership structure) represented by block-holder ownership, while, the dependent variable (financial performance) was proxied by return on asset (ROA).
Concept of Shareholding Structure
Abel and Okafor (2010) define shareholding structure as the percentage of share held by managers (managerial ownership), institutions (institutional ownership), government (state ownership), foreign investors (foreign ownership) and family (family ownership). Jensen et al, (1976), define ownership structure as the distribution of equity with regards to votes and capital as well as the identity of the equity owners. Bansal (2005) states that ownership structure as the committee of investors and shareholders (proprietors) is made up of individual peoples, groups and institutions who have different goals, interests, investment horizons and capabilities in a business.
The concept of ownership structure has been be defined by Kiruri (2013) along two perspectives, namely; ownership concentration which is referred to as the share of the largest owner and is influenced by absolute risk and monitoring costs and secondly, ownership mix while the latter is related to the identity of the major shareholder. Ownership structure is like the hard core of corporate governance composed of a firm’s owners who are those persons who share two formal rights: the right to control the firm and the right to appropriate the firm’s profits, or residual earnings which in theory, could be separated and held by different classes of persons Hansmann (2000).
Concept of Block-holder Ownership
Block-holder ownership also known as concentrated ownership is shareholding with an exceptionally large amount or value of stock. Block-holders is the aggregate fractional holdings of entities who hold more than five per cent of the firm’s shares (Aribaba et al. 2022). Large block-holders who have a strong incentive to closely monitor a firm, may acquire seats on the board, which enhances their ability to monitor effectively. Block-holder ownership refers to an ownership fraction or stake in a firm that is held by shareholders with the controlling interest or with large stake which affords the shareholders the motivation and ability to monitor and control management decisions. Block-holding shareholders use their large stake in reducing conflicts between managers and the organization by being more proactive in monitoring and protecting their investments. Ogabo (2021) claims that block-holders have a lot of funds to invest and exhibit strong fiduciary responsibilities, so they are eager to see their firms perform well. Also, they want to reduce free riders so they closely monitor since the possibility of exit could be expensive. The block-holders achieve concentrated control when they hold a large interest in the company and heavy voting rights, and so, they become involved with the operating decisions of the firm. For this study, block-holder ownership refers to the shareholders who hold controlling interest as a result of the large share they hold.
Concept of Financial Performance
Financial performance measures how well a firm uses its resources to make a profit and it is a vital tool to several stakeholders in a firm. Ogega (2014) points out that there are three major indicators used to measure financial performance of commercial banks. The first one is Return on Assets (ROA) which is a ratio of income to the total assets of the bank. ROA indicates the ability of the bank to realize return on its sources of fund to generate profits. Secondly, Return on Equity (ROE) is the net profit divided by shareholders’ equity and is expressed in percent. It indicates how efficient the bank is utilizing funds invested by the shareholder. Thirdly, Net Interest Margin (NIM) indicates the difference between interest income and interest expense as a percentage of total assets. which reflects the gap between the interest income the bank receives on loans and securities and interest cost of its borrowed funds (Khrawish, 2011).
2.2 Theoretical Review
This study is anchored on the agency theory propounded by Jensen and Meckling, (1976), which is based on the idea of separation of ownership (principal) and management (agent). This is the theory of anchorage because ownership structure and its effect on performance as studied in this work is the basis for separation of ownership and control by management which is the problem agency theory was formulated to solve. The theory holds that in the presence of information asymmetry, the agent is likely to pursue interest that may conflict with that of the principal. Since managers are said to favour perks of office and power even at the expense of shareholders’ interest, they are likely to pursue interests that may hurt their principals (the shareholders). The theory therefore suggests an optimal debt level that would arise as a result of agency cost. The theorists suggested a situation whereby the interest of the managers in the firm should increase in order to be aligning with the owners. The debt level should also be motivated to control managers’ tendency for extra consumption. Free cash flow in a firm can be controlled by increasing the managers’ stake in the firms or debt in the capital structure thereby reducing the amount of free cash available to managers. Agency theory is a theory that has been applied to many fields in the social and management sciences: politics, economics, sociology, management, marketing, accounting and administration. The agency theory is a neoclassical economic theory and is usually the starting point for any debate on the corporate governance.
2.3 Empirical Review
Etale and Yalah (2022) investigated the ownership structure and financial performance of listed consumer goods firms in Nigeria for the period of 2011-2020. The specific objectives were to examine the effect of controlling (concentrated) ownership and non-controlling (dispersed) ownership on return on asset. The data were gathered from the published financial statements of consumer goods firms. The panel data were analyzed through the descriptive statistics; correlation analysis, panel regression and fixed and random effect regression. The result revealed that controlling ownership has positive and non-statistically significant with financial performance, while non-controlling ownership has positive and a significant relationship with financial performance of listed consumer goods firms in Nigeria. The study recommended that firms listed under the sector should imbibe the corporate governance long run strategies to increase the organizational growth.
Aribaba et al. (2022) evaluated the effect of ownership structure on financial performance of quoted
building material firms in Nigeria. The specific objectives of the study were to establish the effect of supervisory ownership, institutional ownership and ownership concentration on financial performance. The ex-post-facto type of qualitative research design was used. Four (4) firms were selected using purposive and random sampling techniques. The data were from secondary sources via annual published financial reports of building material firms for 2011 to 2020. The method of data analysis used were descriptive and ordinary least square regression statistics to measure the inference of the independent variables on the financial performance of the firms. The unit root stationarity test was used to measure the normality of the data. The study reveals that supervisory ownership showed a positive and significant effect on the financial performance, institutional ownership showed a positive and significant effect on the financial performance, while ownership concentration showed negative but significant effect on the financial. The study recommends that the Securities and Exchange Commission encourage more potential managers and institutional shareholders as both managers and institutional shareholders improve the financial performance of quoted building material firms in Nigeria.
Ogabo et al. (2021) examined the impact of ownership structure on firm performance of the Uni Kingdom’s FTSE 350 companies from the 2008-2018 fiscal years. The specific objectives were to explore the impact of managerial and institutional ownership on return on asset, return on equity, and Tobin’s Q as measures of performance. A panel data set of 48 companies with 432 observations was analysed using descriptive statistics, correlation matrix, and regression analysis. The results revealed that there is a significant positive impact of managerial ownership on firm performance without any entrenchment effect at managerial ownership above 5%. The regression results showed that the control variables of the percentage of independent directors on the board increase firms’ performance, while the percentage of women on the board as a control variable decreases firms’ performance. The study offers no recommendations.
Adamu and Haruna (2020) examined the relationship between ownership structure and performance of listed non-financial firms in Nigeria. The specific objectives of the study is to determine the relationship between managerial ownership, ownership concentration, foreign ownership, institutional ownership and Tobin q, return on assets, return on equities, and earnings per shares. Secondary data collected from forty (40) sampled firms. The data were analyzed using canonical correlation and the findings showed that managerial and foreign ownerships are the dominant ownership structures while Tobin q, EPS, and ROA are the dominant performance measures. The study also found that ownership concentration, foreign ownership, and institutional ownership are positively correlated with firm performance, while managerial ownership is negatively correlated with firm performance. The study recommended that listed non-financial firms should encourage foreign investments in their firms and rewards performing managers with shares in the firms.
Dakhlallh et al. (2019) attempt provide empirical evidence concerning the relationship between the ownership structure and firm performance of the shareholding companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE). The specific objectives of the study were to investigate the effect of institutional and block shareholders ownership on Tobin’s q. Firm performance was measured by using Tobin’s Q (TQ). This study also used a moderating variable which is board independence. The panel data were analysed by ordinary lest square multiple regression for a sample of 180 companies listed on Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) for the period from 2009 to 2017. The findings show that the ownership structure mechanisms have a significant influence on firm performance measure by (TQ). So, institutional ownership shows a significant positive relationship with (TQ), however, the findings show block holders ownership have a significant negative relationship with (TQ). On another hand, the moderating effect of board independence has a significant positive effect on the relationship between block holders ownership and (TQ) and has a significant negative on the relationship between institutional ownership and (TQ). They recommend further researches that should examine the moderating or mediating influence of other variables on the relation between chosen variables and firm performance, such as audit committee mechanisms and that future researchers can also use different performance measure, such as ROA, ROE and market share.
Jinadu et al, (2018) investigate whether a significant relationship exists between ownership concentration and corporate performance of Nigerian multinational banks. The specific objectives of the study were to examine the impact of ownership concentration, foreign ownership and domestic ownership on corporate performance. The corporate annual reports for the periods 2010-2014 were utilised as the main source of secondary data. Interesting the research hypotheses, the study adopted the use of panel least square regression method to analyse the data collected from annual reports of the Nigerian multinational banks. Also, the study made use of correlational research design for testing the expected relationship between the variables. Findings revealed a significant negative relationship between ownership concentration and corporate performance of Nigerian multinational banks. In addition, an insignificant positive impact of foreign ownership on corporate performance exists. They also found a significant negative impact of domestic ownership on corporate performance. The study recommended that Nigerian multinational banks should reduce ownership concentration and domestic ownership in order to increase the level of corporate performance. In addition, foreign ownership should be encouraged as a result of its technical expertise and financial support that improve corporate performance.
Nguyen et al, (2015) investigate the impacts of ownership structure on bank performance in Vietnamese banking system using the data collected from the whole 44 banks in the banking system in Vietnam from 2010-2012. The specific objectives of the study were to ascertain the impacts of capital concentration and private ownership on bank profitability. Results show that capital concentration and private ownership have positive impact on bank profitability. Besides, the research results are also consistent with the previous researches (Nguyen, Tran & Pham, 2014) on the positive correlation of corporate governance and bank performance in Vietnam. The findings of this study are also relevant with the previous researches in Kenya, China, Malaysia (Wen, 2010, Rokwaro, 2013). From these findings, it was recommended that banks should encourage the large shareholders participation on the Board of Director to reduce the conflict of interest and the general agency problem in banks and promote private ownership to increase bank profitability.
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